I  C  I  Acd  B  :'C  56>  C^T^ 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION 


INVESTIGATION  OF  ACCIDENT  TO 
SOUTHERN  PACIFIC  LOCOMOTIVE  NO. 
2833,  OPERATED  BY  SOUTHERN  PACIFIC 
COMPANY,  WHICH  OCCURRED  ONE  AND 
ONE-HALF  MILES  WEST  OF  COSGROVE, 
NEVADA,  OCTOBER  3,  1912 


REPORT  OF  CHIEF  INSPECTOR  OF 
LOCOMOTIVE  BOILERS 


PRINTED  BY  ORDER  OF  THE  COMMISSION 
DECEMBER  23,  1912 


WASHINGTON 
1913 


REPORT  OF  THE  INVESTIGATION  OF  ACCIDENT  TO  SOUTHERN 
PACIFIC  LOCOMOTIVE  NO.  2833,  OPERATED  BY  THE  SOUTHERN 
PACIFIC  CO.,  WHICH  OCCURRED  U  MILES  WEST  OF  COSGROVE, 
NEV.,  OCTOBER  3,  1912. 

Washington,  December  18,  1912. 

To  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission: 

As  provided  in  section  8  of  the  locomotive  boiler  inspection  law, 
the  following  report  of  investigation  of  explosion  of  Southern  Pa- 
cific locomotive  No.  2833,  which  occurred  on  October  3,  1912,  at  1.48 
p.  m.,  1^  miles  west  of  Cosgrove,  Nev.,  is  respectfully  submitted: 

This  is  a  consolidated  or  2-8-0  type  of  locomotive  with  wide 
3-piece  construction  crown-bar  type  of  fire  box,  built  by  the  Baldwin 
Locomotive  Works  in  March,  1911,  and  put  in  service  at  Sparks, 
Nev.,  October.  1911. 

At  the  time  of  the  accident  this  locomotive  was  hauling  freight 
extra  west,  consisting  of  46  cars  weighing  1,515  tons.  The  speed 
of  the  train  at  the  time  of  the  accident  was  estimated  at  35  miles 
per  hour;  track  straight  with  a  slightly  descending  grade  for  about 
2  miles  east  from  point  of  accident.  The  boiler  was  blown  clear 
of  frame  and  landed  approximately  400  feet  ahead  and  60  feet  to 
the  left  of  the  point  of  the  explosion.  Four  hundred  and  fifty  feet 
of  track  was  torn  up.  Engineer  N.  L.  Robinson  and  Fireman  C.  C 
Cool  were  killed.    No  other  persons  were  injured. 

Examination  of  the  boiler  showed  that  the  right  side  sheet,  with 
portions  of  the  right  side  of  flue  sheet  and  door  sheet  and  a  portion 
of  the  crown  sheet,  had  been  blown  out.  This  section  of  the  fire  box 
was  blown  downward,  the  sheets  having  doubled  at  the  top  edge  of 
the  mud  ring,  and  were  flattened  against  the  bottom  of  the  mud  ring 
by  the  boiler  rolling  to  an  upright  position  after  landing1. 

The  initial  point  of  failure  was  in  the  right  side  sheet,  all  of  the 
stay  bolts.  382  in  number,  having  pulled  out  of  the  sheet.  The  sheet 
showed  evidence  of  having  been  overheated  from  the  third  hori- 
zontal row  of  stay  bolts  above  the  mud  ring,  which  is  the  top  line 
of  the  brickwork,  to  the  top  row  of  stay  bolts  near  the  croAvn  sheet, 
and  from  the  sixth  vertical  row  from  flue  sheet  to  the  back  end  of 
fire  box.  This  sheet,  as  well  as  the  left  side  sheet,  showed  every 
evidence  of  having  been  exceedingly  hot.  The  central  part  of  both 
side  sheets,  near  the  back  end  of  the  fire  box,  had  evidently  been  the 

71191—13  3 


4  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 

hottest,  the  temperature  having  materially  decreased  near  the  crown 
sheet.  The  flue  sheet  and  flues  were  tinged  with  blue  from  the  bot- 
tom flues  upward,  diminishing  in  hue  toward  the  upper  flues.  The 
crown  sheet  had  been  overheated  from  the  back  end  to  a  point  be- 
tween the  fifth  and  sixth  lateral  rows  of  crown  bolts  from  flue 
sheet,  at  which  point  the  line  of  overheating  was  clearly  defined, 
crossing  from  side  to  side,  and  the  sheet  in  front  of  this,  which  was 
the  highest  part  of  the  crown  sheet,  did  not  show  any  evidence  of 
overheating.  The  crown  flange  seam  of  the  flue  sheet  did  not  show 
the  slightest  sign  of  having  been  overheated.  The  rivets  were  in- 
tact, and  the  calking  edge  not  sprung.  Neither  did  the  longitudinal 
corners  or  bends  of  fire  box  between  the  top  rows  of  stay  bolts  in 
side  sheets  and  outside  rows  of  crown  bolts  show  any  indications  of 
having  been  overheated. 

There  were  two  fusible  plugs  in  the  crown  sheet,  both  in  good  con- 
dition— one  of  the  old  standard  pattern  with  five  ^-inch  holes,  fusi- 
ble-metal filling,  component  parts  of  which  were :  Tin,  1  part ;  lead, 
8  parts;  made  to  fuse  at  a  temperature  of  540°  F.  This  plug  was 
located  between  the  first  and  second  lateral  rows  of  crown  bolts  from 
the  flue  sheet,  which  is  the  highest  point  of  the  crown  sheet,  and  did 
not  show  any  evidence  of  having  been  overheated,  as  the  fusible  metal 
was  intact.  When  removed  and  tested  the  fusible-metal  filling 
started  to  melt  at  a  temperature  of  554°  F.,  and  all  melted  out  at  a 
temperature  of  565°  F. 

The  second  fusible  plug,  known  as  the  Vaughn-Schonfeldt  plug, 
was  located  224  inches  from  the  flue  sheet  directly  over  the  burner. 
This  plug  has  a  ^-inch  opening,  into  which  a  solid  plug  is  sweated 
with  a  coating  of  nearly  pure  tin  made  to  fuse  at  a  temperature  of 
540°  F.  When  removed  and  tested  the  tin  fused  and  plug  dropped 
out  at  a  temperature  of  586°  F. 

All  of  the  flue  beads,  excepting  22  in  the  two  top  rows,  were  sprung 
one  thirty-second  to  one-sixteenth  of  an  inch,  several  of  the  beads 
extending  straight  out.  The  flues  in  the  interior  of  the  boiler  were 
bent  by  the  force  of  the  explosion,  but  none  shows  evidence  of  over- 
heating and  none  shows  evidence  of  collapse. 

The  manner  in  which  the  sheets  were  overheated  shows  conclusively 
that  this  accident  was  due  to  the  character  of  the  water  used  on  this 
division,  as  the  hottest  portion  of  the  sheets  was  just  above  the  line 
of  brickwork,  about  12  inches  from  the  mud  ring,  while  the  fusible 
plugs  in  the  crown  sheet  remained  intact,  and  the  front  end  of  the 
crown  sheet,  which  is  the  highest  portion,  shows  no  indication  of 
having  been  overheated,  which  is  evidence  that  the  water  covered 
this  area  until  the  last  moment  prior  to  the  explosion. 

Much  of  the  water  used  on  this  division  is  bad  and  is  of  a  nature 
that  will  not  absorb  the  intense  heat  generated  bv  a  forced  oil  fire 


INVESTIGATION   OF   ACCIDENT,   COSGROVE,    NEV.  5 

as  rapidly  as  it  can  be  generated;  therefore  the  water  was  driven 
from  the  sheets  at  the  points  which  were  exposed  to  the  greatest  heat 
of  the  fire,  the  result  being  overheated  sheets  and  the  explosion  of 
the  boiler. 

The  water  used  in  this  district  is  treated  after  it  is  in  the  loco- 
motive tender  by  placing  in  the  tender  a  certain  quantity  of  a  boiler 
compound  designed  to  neutralize  the  effect  of  the  impurities  in  the 
water  and  hold  it  down.  While,  no  doubt,  improved  conditions  re- 
sult from  this  water  treatment,  there  still  exists  a  point  beyond  which 
it  is  unsafe  to  go;  therefore  extreme  care  should  be  exercised,  par- 
ticularly with  oil-burning  locomotives  where  water  of  this  character 
is  used,  to  see  that  this  point  is  not  passed. 

An  inspection  of  other  locomotives  in  the  same  district  indicates 
that,  to  a  lesser  degree,  similar  conditions  prevail  on  those  locomo- 
tives, as  side  sheets,  door  sheets,  and  crown  sheets  were  found  to 
be  bulged  at  areas  corresponding  to  those  which  were  burned  in 
locomotive  No.  2833.  This  is  particularly  true  of  locomotives  2831 
and  2832. 

When  the  life  and  condition  of  these  locomotives  is  considered, 
they  having  been  in  service  only  about  one  year,  it  is  apparent  that 
the  boilers  are  being  forced  to  such  an  extent  that  the  light  water 
used  in  that  district  will  not  absorb  the  intense  heat  generated  by 
the  oil  burners. 

Until  such  time  as  better  water  can  be  obtained,  it  would  increase 
the  safety  of  operation  of  these  locomotives  to  reduce  the  tonnage 
or  the  speed  of  trains  so  that  it  would  not  be  necessary  to  force  the 
boilers  to  an  extent  which  endangers  the  lives  of  employees  in  order 
to  generate  sufficient  steam  to  operate  the  trains. 

If  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  these  boilers  be  forced  to  use 
every  heat  unit  that  the  burners  can  give  forth  in  order  to  generate 
sufficient  steam  to  handle  the  desired  tonnage,  or  make  the  time,  it 
would  be  a  safeguard  to  apply  a  fusible  plug  near  the  back  end 
of  the  crown  sheet  at  the  point  where  the  greatest  heat  from  the 
burner  is  concentrated.  Applying  a  fusible  plug  in  this  manner 
may  possibly  result  in  increased  engine  failures,  as  it  is  a  well-known 
fact  that  under  certain  conditions  sufficient  heat  can  be  generated  by 
a  forced  oil  fire  to  fuse  the  metal  in  such  a  plug,  even  though  it  is 
covered  by  water,  but  it  would  serve  to  give  warning  that  the  fire 
was  being  forced  beyond  the  point  of  safety,  and  would  materially 
add  to  the  safety  of  operating  locomotives  in  this  district. 

The  condition  of  the  fire-box  sheets  in  locomotive  2833  also  demon- 
strates the  fact  that  the  heat  from  the  oil  burner  is  not  uniformly 
diffused  throughout  the  fire  box.  Correcting  this  defect  will,  in  a 
measure,  reduce  the  liability  of  overheating  fire-box  sheets  which  are 
covered  with  water. 


6 


INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 


Boiler  appurtenances  were  in  good  condition  so  far  as  could  be 
determined.     Gauge  cocks  were  all  broken  off,  but  openings  to  boiler 


were  found  clear.     Water  glass  was  found  in  good  condition,  and 
openings  to  boiler  were  clear. 


INVESTIGATION    OF   ACCIDENT,   COSGROVE,    NEV.  7 

Injectors,  two  No.  11  simplex,  and  their  connections,  were  in  good 
condition.  Steam  gauge  was  destroyed.  Safety  valves,  one  3|-inch 
muffled  and  one  3i-inch  open,  were  tested  on  another  locomotive 
of  the  same  class  and  found  to  be  in  good  condition,  properly  ad- 
justed and  of  sufficient  capacity. 

The  overheated  areas  in  the  fire  box  are  shown  in  the  diagrams 
contained  in  this  report. 

John  F.  Ensign, 

Chief  Inspector. 

o 


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